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Abstract—This study presents, motivates, and Illustrates
the use of a computational laboratory for the Investigation
of evolutionary trade network formation among strategically
Interacting buyers, sellers, and dealers. The computational
laboratory, referred to as the Trade Network Game Labo
ratory (TNG Lab), Is targetted for the Microsoft Windows
desktop. The TNG Lab is both modular and extensible, and
has a clear, easily operated graphical user interface. It per
mits visualization of the formation and evolution of trade
networks by means of real-time animations. Data tables
and charts reporting descriptive performance statistics are
also provided In real time. The capabilities of the TNG Lab
are demonstrated by means of labor market experiments.
Keywords— Computational laboratory; Buyer^seller trade
networks; Evolution; Network animation; Agent-based com
putational economics; C-l~|- class framework; Labor market
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L Introduction
A GENT-BASED computational modelling is gaining
increased acceptance among social science researchers,
as evidenced by the growing number of journal articles and
books, designated conferences, and formally instituted re
search groups that highlight this methodology for social sci
ence applications.^ A key stumbling block, however, is that
many social scientists do not know how to get started with
computational modelling because they lack a programming
background.
Languages such as Starlogo are simple and easily learned,
but they are not powerful enough for many social and eco
nomic applications. Java and C++ are powerful general-
purpose languages, but they are difficult to master. Au
thoring tools such as AgentSheets, Swarm, and Ascape pro
vide useful repositories of software for building multiagent
interactive systems, but their appeal is primarily to more
experienced programmers.^
David McFadzean is Vice President of Technology with Javien
Canada Inc., Calgary, Canada. E-msiil: david@javien.coni. Deron
Stewart is a consultant computer programmer on Gabriola Island,
Canada. E-mail: deronQdirect.ca. Leigh Tesfatsion (corresponding
author) is a Professor of Economics and Mathematics at Iowa State
University, Ames, Iowa 50011-1070. E-mail: tesfatsi0iastate.edu.
^For a general introduction to agent-based computational so
cial science, see (Ij. The online Journal of Artificial So
cieties and Social Simulation {JASSSJ, freely available at
http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/, regularly provides surv^s of on
going work in computational social science. See also the
Web site on agent-based computational "economics (ACE) at
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesatsi/ace.htm. ACE is the compu
tational study of economies modelled as evolving systems of au
tonomous interacting agents. The extensive resources avsulable at
the ACEWeb site Include surveys, an annotated syllabus of readings,
software, teaching materials, information on conferences and special
journal issues, and pointers to individual researchers and research
groups.
^See http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/arecode.htm for an an
notated list of pointers to these and other software tools for construct-
A computational laboratory (CL) is a framework that
permits the computational study of interactions among
autonomous structurally-differentiated entities by means
of controlled and replicable experiments.® CLs represent
a middle ground between authoring tools and fully cus
tomized application software. A CL can present a clear
and easily manipulated graphical iiser interface that allows
an inexperienced user to systematicdly test the sensitivity
of a system to changes in a wide variety of key parameters
without becoming immersed in implementation details. On
the other hand, a CL can be designed to be both modular
and extensible. Thus, as users gains more experience and
confidence, they can begin to experiment with alternative
module implementations to broaden the range of system
applications encompassed by the CL.
This study presents a particular CL designed for the
study of trade network formation in a variety of market
contexts. The CL, referred to below as the Trade Net
work Game Lab (TNG Lab), comprises hnyers, sellers, and-
dealers who repeatedly search for preferred trade partners,
engage in risky trades modelled as noncooperative games,
and evolve their trade strategies over time.
The top layer of the TNG Lab consists of a graphical
user interface (GUI) that permits the user to systemati
cally test changes in key market parameter values: e.g.,
number of traders of each type; capacity constraints; trade
payoffs; transaction costs; inactivity costs; learning param
eters; and number and length of trading periods. The ef
fects of these market parameter settings on trade network
formation are visualized through a real time animation,
and the user is able to set animation physics parameters
to control this visualization. In addition, data tables and
charts are provided that report various market performance
measures in real time. This top layer is supported by three
lower layers consisting of a general class framework, ex
tension classes, and an .event model. These lower layers
are extensible and modular, permitting more experienced
users to support a much wider range of applications than
reflected by the current TNG Lab GUI.
The basic objective-of this study is to explain the archi
tecture of the TNG Lab and to demonstrative its capabil
ities and usefulness by means of illustrative experiments.
Another objective, however, is to use the example of the
TNG Lab to encourage the routine construction and use
of CLs for social science applications. This second objec
tive will require increased interdisciplinary efforts between
ing multiagent systems.
^The felicitous phratse "computational laboratory" was apparently
first introduced and formally defined by Catherine Dibble (2), a strong
advocate for the use of CLs in human geography.
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social scientists and programmers interested in evolution
ary computation, efforts which could prove to be highly
stimulating and beneficial for both groups.
II. Overview of the TNG Lab Architecture
The TNG Lab is constructed in a four layer architecture.
This architecture is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1: Architecture of the TNG Lab
The bottom, most fundamental layer of the TNG Lab
is the SimBioSys class framework, a general C4-+ toolkit
for developing simulations involving the evolution of pop
ulations of autonomous agents [3]. The basic features of
SimBioSys are outlined in Section III. The SimBioClass
class firamework implementsa designpattern for evolution
arysimulations, controlling overall dynamics ofthe system,
but it does not specify any detailed or specific behaviors.
To create a useful application the framework must be ex
tended by subclassing several key classes.
The secondlayer, TNG/SimBioSys, representsextension
classesthat implement the rules and behaviors of the TVade
Network Game (TNG) [4]. This layer and the SimBioSys
layer together form a complete application sufficient for
generating interesting research results [5],[6], but lacking a
friendly interface. Configuration data is read from an input
file and simulation results are captured in output files. The
basic features of the TNG and the TNG/SimBioSys layer
are described in Sections IV and V.
The third layer, TNG/COM, wraps the simulation func
tionality in a Microsoft component interface that allows
it to be called and controlled by external programs. The
component interface also introduces an event model that
enables interactive applications. This layer is described in
more detail in Section VI. The drawback of using the Mi
crosoft component model is that the framework is no longer
platform-independent at this level. This tradeoff was con
sidered acceptable given that ultimately we are targeting
the Microsoft Windows desktop.
The fourth and final layer implements a graphical user
interface for the simulation. Simulation parameters can be
entered in a form-based screen though they can also still
be saved and read from an input file. An animation screen
and a physics screen allow the researcher to visualize the
simulation dynamics while they evolve, and to fine-tune
this visualization to the application at hand. A results
screen displays simulation output in a table format while
a chart screen displays the same data graphically, both in
real time. These aspects of the TNG Lab are explained
and illustrated in Sections VII and VIII.
III. SimBioSys
As detailed in [3], the SimBioSys class framework is de
signed to handle simulations comprising the following four
features:
• A world defining the virtual environment where the sim
ulation occurs;
• Populations of agents inhabiting the world;
• Progvams driving the behavior of the agents;
• Evolutionary mechanisms emulating natural selection
that act on the agents' programs.
Agents are entities capable of displaying some kind of
active autonomous behavior. A population of agents of a
particular type is represented as a population of computer
programs. In addition to multiple populations of agents,
the world can also include passive entities such as spatially
distributed trails, obstacles, and energy sources.
At the highest level, SimBioSys represents the simula
tion as an abstract base class, bioSimulation. This class
contains member functions and data for the construction
of a world, one or more populations of agents that inhabit
the world, and instruments for the design and control of
the user interface.
An abstract base class, bioWorld, is responsible for the
physics governing the virtual environment of the simula
tion. Derived class instances of bioWorld implement spe
cific environments, such as a rectangular grid or a torus.
An abstract base class, bioPopulation, identifies general
data and operations required for the initial construction
and genetic reproduction of the agent populations that in
habit the world. For example, bioPopulation includes the
size and average fitness of a population as data members,
and it defines member functions for setting the size of the
population and for sorting the population by fitness.
An abstract base class, bioThing, represents all of the
inhabitants of the world. These inhabitants are either pas
sive entities or active autonomous agents. The bioThing
class identifies certain general operations common to all
inhabitants and provides for the storage and retrieval of
the current positions and orientations of the inhabitants.
An abstract base class, bioAgent, is a derived bioThing
class that represents the subset of world inhabitants who
are agents. This class sets general protocols for communi
cation and interactions among agents, and for interactions
between agents and passive entities. Each derived class in
stance of bioAgent constructs a program that allows the
represented agent to perceive its local environment and to
act in response to this perception. The program thus acts
as the agent's brain. An abstract base class, bioProgram,
sets general protocols for the communication between an
agent and its program. One advantage of separating the
function of the program into the class bioProgram is the
ability to substitute different program implementations,
such as finite state machines, artificial neural networks,
and Turing machines, without changing any other aspect
of SimBioSys.
Finally, an abstract base class, bioGType, identifies the
basic elitism, recombination, and mutation operations used
in the genetic reproduction of agent populations. These op
erations act directly on agent genotypes, which are intrin
sic characteristics of agents expressed as bit strings. De
rived class instances of bioGType implement operations for
specific genotypical forms, either haploid (single bit string
form) or diploid (double bit string form). A class derived
from bioAgent, bioPType, stores an instance of bioGType
that is used by bioPopulation to construct an agent's pro
gram before the agent is added to the world.
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TABLE I
SimBioSys Simulation Cycles
int main () {
Initialize world and agent populations;
For (G = 0,...,GMax-l) { // Enter generation cycle loop.
For (E = 0,...,BMax-l) { // Enter environment cycle loop.








As depicted in Table I, applications built using the Sim
BioSysframework typically-execute three nested simulation
loops: generation cycles contain environment cycles, which
in turn contain action cycles. In each action cycle every
agent in the simulation is given the opportunity to make
a single move based on its current state and its perception
of the environment. After a set number of action Q'cles,
an environment step gives the environment an opportunity
to change the state of the world. After a set number of
environment cycles, an evolution step is executed during
which each agent's relative fitness is evaluated and new
populations of agents are separately generated (by type)
based on the previous populations. It is this last step that
introduces evolutionary change into the simulation.
IV. The Trade Network Game
This section briefly outlines the basic features of, the
Trade Network Game (TNG). A more extensive discussion
of these features can be found in [4].
The TNG models the formation and evolution of trade
networks among heterogeneous buyers, sellers, and deal
ers strategically interacting within a market context. The
TNG differs in four essential respects from standard market
models in economics.
First, the TNG is a process model whose structure at
each point in time is given by the internal states and be
havioral rules of the traders rather than by a system of
demand, supply, and equilibrium equations. The TNG
traders must act in accordance with physical feasibility con
straints and accounting identities, by construction. How
ever, the only equations that explicitly appear in the TNG
are those used by the traders themselves to represent as
pects of their world and to implement their behavioral
rules.
Second, the TNG traders continually adapt their behav
ior in response to interactions with other traders and with
their environment in an attempt to satisfy their needs and
wants. That is, behavioral rules are'state-conditioned,
and the traders co-adapt their behavior in an intricate
dance of interactions. The TNG can therefore, exhibit self-
organization.
Third, the evolutionary process is represented in. the
TNG as natural selection pressures acting directly on
trader attributes rather than as population-level laws of
motion. These natural selection pressures induce the TNG
traders to engage in continual open-ended experimentation
with new rules of behavior. That is, the TNG traders co-
evolve.
Fourth, starting from given initial conditions, all events
in the TNG are contingent on trader-initiated interactions
and. occur in a path-dependent time line. Consequently,
the market system described by the TNG develops over
time in a manner analogous to the growth of a culture in
a petri dish.
The TNG accommodates three distinct trader types:
(pure) buyers who only engage in buying activities; (pure)
sellers who only engage in selling activities; and dealers
who can engage in both buying and selling activities. Buy
ers can only buy from sellers or dealers, and sellers can only
sell to buyers or dealers; but dealers can buy from sellers,
sell to buyers, or buy or sell with each other.
Alternative market structures are imposed in the TNG
by prespecifying the number of traders of each type, to
gether with their capacity (resource) constraints. For ex
ample, a 2-sided market is obtained if the number of deal
ers is set to zero, an intermediary market is obtained if
all three trader types are present, and an "endogenous-
type" market is obtained if every trader is a dealer who
can switch from buying to selling, or vice.versa, as the cur
rent situation warrants. In the 2-sided market the buyers
and,sellers might represent workers with limited amounts
of labor time and employers with limited job openings."^ In
the intermediary market the buyers might represent lenders
(bond purchasers) with limited funding needs, the dealers
might represent financial firms with limited service capac
ity, and the sellers might represent borrowers (bond suppli
ers) with limited collateral. In the endogeneous-type mar
ket the traders might be resource-constrained agents who
must each decide whether to become a firm (hire workers)
or to work for others.
Each trader in the TNG is modelled as an autonomous
agent with internalized social norms (market protocols), in
ternally stored state information, and internal behavioral
rules. Although each trader has ,this same general internal
structure, trader t3T3es can differ from each other in terms
of their specific market protocols, fixed attributes, and ini
tial endowments; and each trader can acquire different state
information and evolve different trade behavioral rules over
time on the basis of its own unique past experiences.
Activities in the TNG are divided into a sequence of gen
erations. Each trader in the initial generation is assigned
a rule ("personality") governing its behavior in its trade
interactions, an initial expected.utility assessment for each
of its potential trade partners, and a capacity constraint
on the number of trade offers it can make or accept at any
given time depending on the trader's type. The traders
then repeatedly engage in three types of activities for a
certain specified number of rounds: (1) a search for, and
determination of, preferred trade partner matches on the
basisof current expected utility assessments; (2) trade in-
^This example is used inSection VIII to demonstrate thecapabili
ties of the TNG Lab.
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teractions with trade partners, modelled as noncooperative
games; and (3) an updating of expected utility assessments
to take into account any newly incurred search costs, in
activity costs, and trade payoffs. The traders of each type
then separatelyevolve (structurally modify) their trade be
havioral rules based on the past net payoff outcomes se
cured with these rules, and a new generation commences.
V. TNG/SimBioSys
This section briefly outlines how the activities of the
TNG traders are implemented with the support of Sim-
BioSys. A more detailed discussion of the resulting
TNG/SimBioSys class framework can be found in [5].
The static structure of TNG/SimBioSys is expressed
through definitions and relationships for three principal
classes;
• tngSimulation, which manages the overall simulation;
• tngPopulation, which manages the evolution of the
traders;
. tngTradeBot, which simulates a single trader (either a
buyer, a seller, or a dealer).
These classes are deriv^ from the SimBioSys abstract
base classes discussed in Section III. Specifically, as de
picted in Fig. 2, tngSimulation is derived from bioSimu-
lation, tngPopulation is derived from bioPopulation, and
tngTradeBot is derived from bioPType, which in turn isde
rived from bioAgent. TNG/SimBioSys constructs a single
instance of tngSimulation, which in turn constructs a sin
gle instance of tngPopulation; and tngPopulation then con
structs a collection of traders as tngTradeBot instances.®
Fig. 2: TNG/SimBioSys Class Structure
The key aspect of TNG/SimBioSys is the representa
tion of each trader as a tradebot, i.e., as an instance of the
class tngTradeBot. A schematic description of the internal
structure of a tradebot is given in Table II. Three features
of this description are of particular interest.
First, social norms (market protocols) regarding the de
termination of trade partners and the conduct of trades are
expressed as member functions of tngTradeBot that are
commonly inherited and implementated by all tradebots
of a given type. Second, additional aspects of the trade
behavior of each tradebot are ^pressed as individualized
behavioral rul^, i.e., as member functions of tngTradeBot
inherited by the tradebots whose implementations can dif
fer from one tradebot to another both within and across
tradebot types. These differences can occur both through
tradebot-specific initial configurations and through evolu
tionary change. Third, each tradebot stores addresses for
other tradebots. This permits each tradebot to identify
itself to other tradebots it interacts with and to pass mes
sages to other tradebots at event-driven times.
In principle, all of the behavioral rules of a tradebot
could be subject to evolutionary selection pressures. As
®As developed to date, TNG/SimBioSys does not exploit the ca
pability provided by the SimBioSys abstract base class bioWorld to
situate the tradebots in a virtual spatial environment subject both
to biological processes (e.g., plant growth) and to physical laws (e.g.,
conservation of energy).
TABLE II




Market protocols for communication;
Market protocols for search and matching;
Market protocols for trade interactions.
Internal Behavioral Rules:
My rules for gathering and processing information;
My rule for determining my trade behavior;
My rule for updating my expected utility assessments;
My rule for measuring my utility (fitness) level;
My rules for modifying my rules.
Internally Stored State Information:
My attributes;
My endowments;
My beliefs and preferences;
Addresses I have for myself and other tradebots;
Additional data I have about other tradebots.
};
developed to date, however, TNG/SimBioSys only permits
the evolution of each tradebot's rule for determining its
trade behavior.
The dynamic structure of TNG/SimBioSys is depicted
in Table III. The simulation begins with an initialization
step during which each tradebot is constructed, assigned
a randomly specified trade behavioral rule, and configured
with various user-supplied parameter values according to
its type (buyer, seller, or dealer). For simplicity, in the
current implementation of TNG/SimBioSys it is assumed
that traders of each type are identically configured. Thus,
all buyers are configured with the same parameter values,
and similarly for all sellers and all dealers. The tradebots
then enter into a generation cycle loop comprising three
types of events: a "trade cycle loop," an "environment
step," and an "evolution step."
The trade cycle loop consists of a user-specified number
of successive trade cycles. In each trade cycle, the trade
bots undertake three basic activities: a search for and de
termination of preferred trade partners, given current ex
pected utility levels; trade interactions with trade part
ners, modelled as noncooperative games; and the updating
of expected utility levels based on any new costs incurred
and/or payoffs receivedduring trade partner determination
and trading.
At the end of the trade cycle loop the tradebots enter into
an environment step. In this step each tradebot assesses
its fitness, meeisured as the total payoff (net of costs) that
it earned during the preceding trade cycle loop.
At the end of the environment step an evolution step
is executed. In this step, each member of each distinct
tradebot population (buyers, sellers, or dealers) evolves its
trade behavioral rule. Specifically, in addition to engag
ing in inductive learning by experimentation with the use
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of new trade behavioral rules, each tradebot also engages
in social learning by mimicking aspects of the behavioral
rules used by more successful tradebots of its own type.
Experimentation and mimicry for each tradebot type are
currently implemented by means of a genetic algorithm in
volving standardly specified elitism, mutation, and recom
bination operations.®
At the end of the evolution step, each evolved tradebot
updates its initial expected utility assessment for each of its
potential trade partners. It does this by taking a weighted
average of the expected utility it assigned to this poten
tial trade partner at the beginning of the latest generation-
and the expected utility it currently assigns to this poten
tial trade partner. The memory of each evolved tradebot is
wiped clean apart from its tag identifier (name) and its up
dated initial expected utility assessments for its potential
trade partners. The three evolved tradebot populations
then enter into a new generation cycle, and the whole pro
cess repeats.
As seen by comparing Table I with Table III, a genera
tion cycle loop in TNG/SimBioSys corresponds to a gen
eration cycle loop in SimBioSys, and a trade cycle loop
in TNG/SimBioSys corresponds to an action cycle loop in
SimBioSys. However, there is no environment cycle loop in
TNG/SimBioSys. Rather, for each generation there is in
effect a single environment t^cle consisting of a trade cycle
loop, an environment step, and an evolution step.
VI. TNG/COM
In the two-layer implementation (TNG/SimBioSys), the
cycles are executed without interruption, generating a
batch output of simulation results. One challenge of wrap>-
ping the functionality in a component layer was to intro
duce an event model into the cycle dynamics that would
enable a graphical front end application to display simula
tion results in real time and interactively.
The introduction of the event model was accomplished
by replacing the main SimBioSys loop with another im
plementation that fires events at key points in the hierar
chy of cycles. Pseudo-code for the TNG/COM main loop
with event firing is depicted in Table IV. For .simplicity, the
events that signal that the simulation has been paused or
stopped have been omitted from Table IV. In the actual
TNG/COM code, the inclusion of these events is accom
plished by splitting the main() function into event handlers.
The calls to FireXxx() raise a corresponding event Xxx
®As currently implemented, all buyers in TNG/SimBioSys have
identical structural attributes apart from their evolving trade behav
ioral rules, and similarly for sellers and deaJers. Social learning is
then implemented by having each tradebot mimic the trade behavior
of other successful tradebots of the same type. Since each tradebot
in TNG/SimBios is uniquely tagged and tracked throughout each
simulation run, however, more general structural specifications and
learning implementations are possible. Note that the usefulness of
mimicry as a learning mechanism is substantially reduced in mar
ket contexts in which the treiders within each trader type have dis
tinct structural attributes (e.g., differentiated capacities, payoffs, or
costs). Consequently, for such applications, the current implementa
tion of TNG/SimBioSys should be modified to permit the tradebots




int main () {
Init();
For (G = 0,...,GMax-l) {,









// Construct initial tradebot 1
// populations (buyers, sellers,
// and dealers) with randomly
// specifled trade rules, and
// configure each tradebot
// with user-supplied parameter
// values (initial expected
// utility levels, capacities,...).
// Enter generation cycle loop.
II Generation Cycle:
II Enter trade cycle loop.
II Trade Cycle;
II Determine trade partners,
// given expected utility
// levels, and record search
// and inactivity costs.
// Implement trades and
II record trade payoffs.
// Update expected utility levels
// using newly recorded
// costs and trade payoffs,
// and begin new trade cycle.
// Environment Step:
II ' Tradebots assess their Btnesses.
// Evolution Step;
II Tradebot populations separately
// evolve their trade rules, and
// a new generation cycle begins.
TABLE IV
TNG/COM Main Loop Pseudo-Code With Event Firing
int main () (
Init();
FireSimRunningO;
For (G = 0 GMax-1) {
FireGeneratlonBeginO;












which is (optionally) handled by a controlling program, in
this case the TNG Lab. Other substantially different inter
active applications could also be built on the TNG/COM.
When the events fire at the TNG/COM level, control is
passed back up to^ the higher level application giving it an
opportunity to update its interactive displays and/or act
on user input such as a menu selection or a pushbutton
press to pause the simulation." As can be observed in the
Table IV pseudo-code, an appropriate event is fired at the
beginning and end of each major cycle. The SimRunning
event is fired after the simulation has been initialized to al
lowthe controlling application to do necessaryinitialization
based on the configuration parameters. The correspond
ing SimFinished event gives the controlling application a
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chance to clean up and to carry out and report an\' final
calculations.
VII. TNG Lab Graphical User Interface
Ascurrently implemented, the TNG Lab GUI consists of
five distinct screens. A Settings Screen permits the user to
set keymarket parameter values. A Results Screen permits
the user to view simulation performance data in tabular
form in real time. A Chart Screen permits the user to view
simulation performancedata in graphical form in real time.
An Ammation Screen permits the user to view the evolu
tion of trade networks in a real-time animation. Finally, a
Physics Screen permits the user to set animation physics
parameters to control the network visualization. The TNG
Lab GUT opens in the Settings Screen. The user can then
use tabs to enter or exit each of the other screens as desired.
More precisely, the Settings Screen permits the user to
set key market parameter values for each TNG/SimBioSys
simulation run. As will be illustrated in the context of a
concrete labor market application in Section Vlll, these
values control market structure, payoffs, the finite state
machine (FSM) representation for trade rules, and the
form of the genetic algorithm (GA) learning mechanism.
A screen shot of the Settings Screen for a 2-sided market
simulation run with equal numbers of buyers and sellers is
shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3: TNG Lab GUI SettingsScreen
As seen in Fig. 3, the market structure parameters in
clude the total number of buyers, the total number of sell-
eis, the total number of dealers, the buyer <iiiota level (for
buyers and dealers), and the seller quota level (for sellers
and dealers). The payoff parameters include four trade
(prisoner's dilemma) payoffe, an initial expected utility as
sessment, a refusal payoff, an inactivity payoff, and an ex
perience gain parameter. The initial expected utility as
sessment is the assessment used by each tradebot for each
potential trading partner at the start of the first genera
tion. The refusal payoff is a nonpositive transactions cost
incurred a buyer whenever one of its offers to buy is
refused. The inactivity payoff is the payoff incurred by
a tradebot who neither makes nor accepts offers during
the course of a trade cycle. The inactivity payoff can be
positive, zero, or negative depending on the application.
For example, the inactivity payoffmight be positive in the
context of a market with welfare support. The experience
gain parameter is the weight that each tradebot applies to
its most recent experiences when updating its current ex
pected utility assessments at the end of an evolution step
in preparation for the start of a new generation.
Also, the FSM parameters include the number of internal
states for the FSM representation, and a memor\' param
eter controlling how many past moves of a current trade
partner are recalled (along with the current FSM state) to
condition the choice of a current action. The GA learning
parameters includethe total number of generations, the to
tal number of trade cycles per generation, a mutation rate.
and an elite percentage separatelv' specified for eacli trade
bot type (buyer, seller, and dealer). In addition, a see<l
value has to be set to initialize the pseudo-random number
generator.
The Results Screen p>ermits the xiser to view fitness data
for the tradebot^ as each simulation run proceeds. Mean
and standard deviation calculations for the fitness of each
tradebot- type, and for all tradebots together, are provided
in separate columns. The key columns of interest are the
four columns that provide average fitness data for buy
ers, for sellers, for dealers, and for all tradebots together.
These key columns are highlighted in colors that are con
sistently i^ed throughout the TNG Lab GUI: namely, blue
for buyers; yellow for sellers; green for dealers; and red for
all tradebots together. Only columns for tradebot t>-pes
actually present in a current simulation run are activated.
Fig. 4 shows a screen shot of the Results Screen for the
2-sided market simulation run in Fig. 3. This screen shot
was taken at the end of the simulation run with the Results
Screen scrolled to data for the final generations.
Fig. 4; TNG Lab GUI Results Screen
The Chart Screen permits the user to view in separate
charts the average, maximum, and minimiun fitness lev
els achieved by tradebots of each type, and by tradebots
as a whole, as each simulation run proceeds. The charts
for average fitn^ are color coded using the same colors
that were used for the Results Screen: blue for buyers; yel
low for sellers; green for dealers; and red for all tradebots.
Only charts for tradebot tj-pes actually present in a current
simulation run are activated.
Fig. 5 showsa screen shot for one of the charts provided
by the Chart Screen for the 2-sided market simulation run
in Fig. 3. This screen shot ws^ taken at the end of the
simulation run and uses color-coded line charts to depict
the average fitness levels achieved by buyers and sellers in
each generation.
Fig. 5: TNG Lab GUI Chart Screen
Tlie Animation Screen was introduced to allow re
searchers an opportunity to gain insight into the dynamics
of trade network formation by watching the tradebots in
teract with each other in real time. The abstract game
simulation modeled in the lower layers of the architecture
(TNG/SimBioSys) is modeled as a physical simulation in
the top layer (TNG Lab).^
Each tradebot is represented in the Animation Screen
by a point mass and is displayed as a letter with a numer
ical subscript. The letters "B", "S", and "D" stand for
"buyer", "seller" and "dealer" respectively. The numerical
subscript serves t-o differentiate tradebots of the same type.
The letters with numerical subscripts are color-coded in
conformity with the Results Screen and the Chart Screen:
''The animation physics for the TNG Lab is motivated in part by
previous work on network animation for iterated prisoner's dilemma
gams with choice and refusal of partoers; see Stanley et al. |7] and
Smudcer et ai. [81. Pointers to other work on network visualization can
be found at the Web Site on the Formation of Economic and Social
Networks at http://www.econ.iastate.ftdu/tesfatai/Detgroup.ht.m.
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namely, blue for buyers; yellow for sellers; and green for
dealers.
Forces, modeled as simple springs, act on the tradebots
to create relationships (bonds) among them. The anima
tion physics distinguishes among three types of relation
ships: latched (continuous); transient (temporary); and re
current (intermittent). This classification is accomplished
bymeans of frequency threshold settings FL and FT.
Specifically, at the end of each trade cycle A, the rela
tionship between any twotradebotswho arepotential trade
partners is classified as follows. The two tradebots arein a
latched relationship if the tradebots have traded with each
other at least once in each of the last A/FL trade cycles,
and if each tradebot currently has a nonnegative expected
utility assessment for the other. A latdied relationship is
implemented as a spring with a relatively short rest length
and displayed as a solid line. The two tradebots have a
transient relationship either if they have not traded with
each other at all in any of the last A/FT trade cycles, or
if at least one of the two tradebots currently has a nega
tive expected utility assessment for the other. Once a re
lationship between two tradebots is classified as transient,
the relationship is not depicted visually and any bond that
previouslyexisted between the two tradebots is destroyed.
Finally, the two tradebots have a recurrent relationship if
their relationship is neither latched nor transient. A recur
rent relationship is implemented as a spring with a rela
tively long rest length and displayed as a dashed line.
Three additional forces are also introduced in the sim
ulation in order to enhance the visualization. First, each
tradebot acts as a point charge, repelling every other trade
bot with a force that varies inversely with the square of the
distance separating them. This prevents groups of trade
bots from overlapping, which would obscure the visualiza
tion. Second, the walls of the arena (the inside borders
of the window containing the animation) have a repelling
effect on each tradebot with a force that varies inversely
with the square of the perpendicular distzince separating
the tradebot from the wall. This forces pushes each trade
bot back into the arena when other forces threaten to push
it out of sight. Finally, a frictional force that is proportional
and opposite to a tradebot's current velocity is introduced
to dampen oscillations.
Each step in the animation coincides with the end of
a trade cycle. The forces on each tradebot due to bonds
with other tradebots and repulsion forces are summed up,
and the resulting vector is applied to the tradebot's posi
tion in the arena. The result of these simple calculations
is the emergence of a dynamic trade network visualization.'
Groups oftradebots are seen to make initial deals with each
other and to tentatively form a network. One or more of
these tradebots may ultimately engage in too many defec
tions, however, breaking the alliance. The ostracized de
fectors then move elsewhere, seeking more profitable trades
with new partners. The visual effect is quite compelling. .
A screen shot of the Animation Screen for the 2-sided
market simulation run in Fig. 3 is shown in Fig. 6. For this
run, the 12 buyers and 12 sellers manage to self-organize
into 12 disjoint buyer-seller pairs by about the twenti
eth generation, and this network formation then persists
throughout the remaining thirty generations. Fig. 6 gives
the still display ofthe network formation at the endofthe
final (50th) generation.
Fig. 6: TNG Lab GUIAnimation Screen
Finally, the Physics Screen permits the user to set the
frequency theshold parameters FL and FT, the spring rest
lengths and strengths for both latched and recurrent rela
tionships, the repulsion forces (trader, boundary), and the
frictional force. These physics parameters permit the user
to tailor the network visualization in the Animation Screen
to the application at hand. A screen shot of the Physics
Screen for the 2-sided market simulation run in Fig. 3 is
shown in Fig. 7.
Fig. 7: TNG Lab GUI Physics Screen
VIII. Labor Market Application
This section first outlines a labor market frame
work that has been implemented with the support of
TNG/SimBioSys [6]. Experiments conducted with this
framework are then used to illustrate the capabilities of
the TNG Lab. These experiments address an important
unresolved issue in current labor market research, referred
to as the "excess heterogeneity" problem [9]. Briefly, the
issue is why observationally equivalent workers and em
ployers have markedly different earnings and employment
histories.
A. Labor Market Framework
The labor market is a 2-sided market consisting of NW
worker suppliers ("buyers" of job openings) and NB em
ployers ("sellers" of job openings),whereNW and NE are
arbitrary positive integers. Each work supplier is assumed
to have the same (work) quota WQ^ where WQ is the max
imum number of potential work offers that each work sup
pliercanfeasibly service at anygiven time.® Similarly, each
employer is assumed to have the same (employment) quota
EQ, where EQ is the maximum number of job openings
that each employer can provide at any given time.
As in Table III, activities in the labor market are di
vided into a sequence of generations. Each work supplier
and employer in the initial generation is assigned a ran
domly generated rule governing its worksite behavior, an
initial expected utility ass^rnent for each of its potential
worksite partners, and a quota governing its size. The work
suppliers and employers then enter into a trade cycle loop
during which they repeatedly search for preferred work
site partners on the basis of their current expected utility
assessments, engage in worksite interactions modelled as
prisoner's dilemma games, and update their expected util
ity assessments to take into account newly incurred job
®When WQ exceeds'l, each work supplier can be interpreted as
some type of information service provider (e.g., broker or consultant)
that is able to supply services to at most WQ employers at a time
or as some type of union organization that is able to oversee v/ork
contracts with at most WQ employers at a time.
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search costs, inactivity costs, and worksite payoffs. At the
end of the trade cycle loop, the work suppHers and env-
ployers each separately evolve (structurally modify) their
worksite behavioral rules beised on the past net payoff out
comes secured %ith these rules, and a new generation then
commences.
Matches between work suppliers and employers are de
termined using a one-sided offer auction. Each work sup
plier first submits work offers to a maximum oi WQ em-
plcyers it ranks as most preferableon the basis of expected
utility and who it judges to be tolerable in the sense that
their expected utility is not negative. Each emplcyer then
selects up to EQ of the work offers it has received to date
that it finds tolerable and most preferable on the basis of
expected utility, and it places these selected work offers
on a waiting list; all other work offers are refused. Work
suppliers who have work offers refused then redirect these
work offers to any tolerable preferred employers who have
not, yetrefused them, andthe process repeats. Once anem-
plover stops receiving new work offers, it accept all work
offers currently on its waiting list.
A work supplier incurs a job search cost in the form
of a negative refusalpayoffR each and every time that an
employer refuses one of its workoffers during a trade cycle;
the employer who does the refusing is not penalized. A
work supplier or employer who neither submits nor accepts
work offers duringa trade cycle receives an inactivity payoff
0 for the entire trade cycle. The refusal and inactivity
payoffs are each assumed to be measured in utility terms.
If an employer accepts a work offer from a work supplier
in any given trade cycle, the work supplier and employer
are said to be matched for that trade cycle. Each match
constitutes a mutually agreed upon contract stating that
the worksupplier shall supply labor services at the worksite
of the employer until the beginningof the next trade cycle.
These contracts are risky in that outcome are not assured.
Specifically, worksuppliers and employerscan each shirk
on the worksite, to the detriment of the other, and can pos
sibly improve their ownwelfare by doing so. Work suppliers
can reduce their disutility of work in the short run by not
working as hard as their employers expect, and employers
can enhance their profit in the short run by not providing
benefits their work suppliers expect to receive. Offsetting
these incentives are factors that discourage shirking. Em
ployers can punish shirking worksuppliers by firing them
(i.e., by refusing all of their future work offers), and work
siippliers can punish shirking employers by quitting (i.e.,
by redirecting their future work offers elsewhere).
These various possibilities are captured by having each
matched work supplier and employer engage in a worksite
interaction modelled as a two-person prisoner's dilemma
game. The work supplier can either cooperate (exert high
work effort) or defect (shirk). Similarly, the employer can
either cooperate (provide good working conditions) or de
fect (shirk). The range of possible worksite payoffs is as
sumed to be the same for each worksite interaction in e^ach
trade cycle: namely, a cooperator whose worksite partner
defects receives the lowest possible payoffL (suckerpayoff);
a defector whose worksite partner also defects receives the
next lowest payoff D (mutual defection payoff); a coop
erator whose worksite partner also cooperates receives a
higher payoff C (mutual cooperation payoff): and a defec
tor whose worksite partner cooperates recei%'es the highest
possible payoff H (temptation payoff).
The worksite payoffs are assumed to be measured in util
ity terms and to be normalized about the inactivity payoff
0 so that L<0<0<C<//. Thus, a work supplier or
employer that ends up either as a sucker with payoffL or in
a mutual defection relation with payoff D receivers negative
utilit>', a worse outcome than inactivity (unemployment or
vacancy). The worksite payoffs are also assumed to satisfv'
the usual prisoner's dilemma regularity condition (L+//)/2
< C guaranteeing that mutual cooperation dominate-s al
ternating cooperation and defection on average.
Each trader, whether a work supplier or an employer,
uses a simple reinforcement learning algorithm to update
its expected utility assessments on the basis of new pay
off information during the course of each tra<ie cycle loop.
Specifically, a trader assigns an initial expected utility
U° to each potential worksite partner c with whom it has
not yet interacted. Each time an interaction ^*.ith r takes
place, Vforms an updated expected utility assessment for
2 by summing W* together with all payoffs received to date
from interactions with 2 (including both worksite {>ayoffs
and refusal payoffs) and then dividing this sum by one plus
the number of interactions with z.
Tlie personality of each trader, as expressed in its work
site interactions, is governed by a worksite (behavioral) rule
that is maintained throughout the course of each trade cy
cle loop. These worksite rules are represented as finite-
memory pure strategies for pla\ing a prisoner's dilemma
game with an arbitrary partner an indefinite number of
times. At the commencement of each trade cycle loop,
traders have no information about the worksite rules of
other traders: each trader can only learn about these rules
by engaging other traders in repeated worksite interactions
and observing the actions and payoff outcomes that ensue.
Each trader keeps separate track of its interaction history
with each p>otential worksite partner, and each trader's
choice of an action in a current worksite interaction with
another trader is determined on the basis of its own past
interactions with this other trader plus its initial expected
utility assessment of the trader. This means, in particular,
that a trader can end up revealing different aspects of its
personality to different worksite partners due to differences
in their interaction histories. For example, a work supplier
may develop a mutually cooperative relationship with one
employer while at the same time it is shirking on the job
with a second employer.
At the end of each trade cycle loop, the utility (fitness)
of each trader is measured by normalized total net payoff,
that is, by total net payoff divided by the fixed number of
trade cycles constituting each trade cycle loop. For work
suppliers, total net payoffis measured by total net work
site payoffs plus the (negative) sumof any incurred refusal
payoffs. For employers, total net payoff is simply measured
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by total net worksite payoffe.
The work suppliers and employers then separately evolve
their worksite rules by means of standardly specified ge
netic algorithms involving elitism, mutation, and recom
bination operators biased in favor of more successftJ (fit)
traders. The elitism operator ensures that the most suc
cessful worksite rules are retained undianged from one gen
eration to the next. The mutation operator ensures that
work suppliers and employers continually experiment with
new worksite rules (inductive-learning). The recombina
tion operator ensures that work suppliers and employers
continually engage in mimicry (social learning). Specifi
cally, if the use of a worksite rule successfully results in a
high fitness for a trader of a particular type, then, through,
recombination operations, other traders of the same type
will tend to modify their ownworksite rules to more closely •
resemble the successful rule.
At the end of the evolution step, "each work supplier
or employer v updates its initial expected utility assess
ment for each of its potential trade partners z by taking
a weighted average of the expected utility it assigned to z
at the beginning of the latest generation and the expected
utility it now assigns to z at the end of this latest genera
tion. For example, suppose the current generation isG > 0,
the expected utility assigned by v to z at the beginning of
G was U°{G), and the expected utility now assigned by v
to z at the end of generation G is C7*(G). Then
(7-(G + l) = Il-e]-(7''(c;) + e-;7^(G), (1)
where the experience gain e lies between 0 and 1.®
B. Illustrative Experimental Findings
Consider the special case of a balanced concentration la
bor market consisting of NW=\2 work suppliers (buyers of
job opening) and NE=\2 employers (sellers of job open
ings). Each work supplier has a quota WQ on the number
of work offers it can make at any given time, and each em
ployer has a quota EQ on the number of job openings it
can provide at any given time. Define the' (relative) job
capacity (JCAP) of this economy to be the ratio of total
potential job openings {NB •EQ) to total potential work
offers (NW •WQ). Under the balanced concentration as
sumption, JCAP simply reduces to the size ratio EQjWQ.
This section reports TNG Lab experimental findings re
garding the effects of systematic variations in JCAP on
the work suppliers and employers. The primary purpose
in reporting these findings is to convey in general terms
the capabilities of the TNG Lab in facilitating interesting
socioeconomic research. Consequently, the findings will be
explained and motivated here at a general intuitive level.
A detailed and rigorous discussion of these and many ad
ditional related findings can be found in Tesfatsion [6].
®For simplicity, it is currently assumed that all tradebots use the
same ibced values for the initial expected utility level C/®(0) and for
the experience gain parameter e, as specified by the user on the Set
tings Screen for the TNG Lab GUI. Eventually, however, it would
be interesting to permit individual tradebots to have different
values and to evolve e over time on the basis of their own unique
experiences.
Three distinct JCAP treatments are tested by specihing
three distinct settings for the quotas WQ and EQ, as fol
lows: (1) WQ=2 and EQ=\, implying JCAP=ll2 (tight
job capacity); WQ = 1 and EQ = 1, implying JCAP=l
(balanced job capacity); and WQ = 1 and EQ = 2,
implying JCAP = 2 (excess job capacity). Apart from
these quota parameter variations, and changes in seed val
ues for the pseudo-random number generator, all other
TNG/SimBioSys parameters in the Settings Screen are
maintained at fixed values throughout all experiments. Fig.
3 displays the Settings Screen for a balanced job capacity
experiment with the "buyer quota" WQ set to 1, the "seller
quota" EQ set to 1, and the seed value set to 19.
Intuitively, work suppliers should be fayored when
JCAP is large, since the labor market then has a poten
tially excess supply of job openings. Conversely, employers
should be favored when JCAP is small, since the economy
then has a potentially excess demand for job openings. The
following plausible hypothesis will therefore be tested:
JCAP Hypothesis: As JC7>1P increases, all else equal, the
average utility (fitness) level attained by work suppliers
increases and the average utility (fitness) level attained
by employers decreases.
Table V reports findings for each of the three tested
JCAP treatments. For each treatment, 20 runs were gen
erated using 20 different seed values for the pseudo-random
number generator. As will be clarified further below, the
first two columns of Table V report observed network for
mation clusters, the next three columns report means and
standard deviations for observed behavioral attributes sup
ported by these network formation clusters, and the final
two columns report means and standard deviations for ob
served welfare and market power outcomes supported by
these network formation clusters.
The first column of Table V, labeled classifies ob
served network formations in accordance with a distance
measure D°. The origin 0 of this distance measure cor
responds to a benchmark "competitive" network forma
tion in which any unemployment is distributed uniformly
across work suppliers, any vacancies are distributed uni
formly across employers, and all traders always cooperate
(implying all relationships are recurrent). By construction,
larger D° values imply larger deviations away from this
competitive network formation.
The second column of Table V, labeled "% of Runs,"
gives the percentage of the twenty runs for each treatment
that lie within^ the indicated range of D° values. The first
interesting aspect to note about the Table V results is that,
for each JCAP treatment, the network formations lie in
two or three sharply distinguished distance clusters, with
one cluster markedly dominating the others in percentage
terms. The dominant distance cluster (55%) for tight job
capacity is the D° interval 1-7, the dominant distance clus
ter (70%) for balanced job capacity is the D° level 12, and
the dominant distance cluster (70%) for excessjob capacity
is the D° interval 14-17.
Thus, for each treatment, the network histogram is spec-
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tral in form with two or three isolated peaks; there is no
.smooth, bell-shaped, central tendency distribution. Figs.
« through 10 illustrate the three distinct types ofnetworks
that arise for the tight job capacity treatment with JCAP
- 1/2: namely, largely recurrent: amix oflatched and tran
sient; and fully transient (a "wallftower" economy). Each
figure presents an Animation Screen still display ofthenet
work formation in the final generation of a single simulation
run. Theonly change from onerun to the next is a change
iji the seed value for the random number generator.
Fig. 8: Network Formation Under Tight Job Capacity
with D" in 1-7
Fig 9- Network Formation Under Tight Job Capacity
with D" in 12-14
Fig 10: Network Formation Under Tight Job Capacity
with IT =24
Nextconsider the Table V columns labeled Aggressive,
"P-Inactive," and "P-Nice." These columns report means
and standard deviations for the behavioral characteristics
of work suppliers and employers in the final generation of
each run. For each treatment, these behavioral attribut.es
are separately calculated for each distinct distance cluster
indicated in column one.
The Aggressive column reports means and standard de
viations for the percentages ofwork suppliers and employ
ers in the final generation who defect against work part
ners with whom they have not previously traded. The F-
Inactive (xjlumn reports me-ans andstandard deviations for
the percentages ofwork suppliers and employers who be
come persistently inactive (unemployed or vacant) by the
final generation. Finally, the P-Nicecolumn reports means
and standard deviations for the percentages of work sup
pliers and employers in the final generation who become
persistently cooperative.^®
The final two columns of Table V labeled "Utility" and
"MPower" report means and standard deviations for the
utility (fitness) and market power levels achieved by the
final generation of work suppliers and employers. These
levels are separately calculated for each distinct distance
cluster indicated in column one. Market power is measured
in percentage terms as the difference between the utility a
trader attsuns in the experimental labor market and the
utility the trader would instead attain in the competitive
network formation, in ratio to the latter utility.
Consider, now, the JCAP hypothesis. Restricting atten
tion to dominant distance cl\isters in Table V, it is seen that
this hypothesis receives strong support. Theme^ utility
level attained by work suppliers in the dominant distance
cluster increasesdramatically as JCAP increases from 1/2
to 2 whereas the mean utility level attained by employers
declines. As shown in Tesfatsion [6, Table 61, the JCAP
hypothesis is still supported even when all data for each
treatment are aggregated together. Nevertheless, Table V
'®The technical meaning of the important qualifier "persistently"
is carefully explzuned in Tesfatsion 16]. The objective is to avoid
classifying behaviors on the basis of transient attributes.
10
shows how misleatling it can be to simply pool data across
distance clusters for each treatment.
For example, in the tight job capacity case reported in
Table V(a), complete coordination failure is seen to occur
in 25% of the runs: namely, in distance cluster £>"=24. In
this distance cluster. I007c of the work suppliers end up
persistently unemployed and 100% of the employers end
up persistently vacant. The difficulty is that each work
supplier has a hard time finding job openings because jobs
are scarce relative to work offers. Consequently, each work
supplier tends to accumulate many (negative) refusal pay
offs during the job search process. If too many refusals
are accumulated from any one employer, the work supplier
will cease making work offers to this employer because the
expected utility it assigns to this employer will drop below
^ro. If this happens for too many employers, the work
supplier will simply withdraw altogether from the labor
market, preferring unemployment (at inactivity cost 0) to
the risk of sustaining additional negative refusal payoffs.
This is precisely what occurs for each work supplier in dis
tance cluster D° = 24.
Finally, consider the implications of Table V for the
"excess heterogeneity" issue highlighted at the beginning
of this section. The issue in question is why obser\'a-
tionally equivalent workers and employers are oteerved to
have markedly different, earnings and employment histo
ries. Reoiill that, for each treatment reported in Table V,
all work suppliers have observationally identical struct.ural
attributes at the start of the first generation, and simi
larly for all employers. The work suppliers and employers
separately evolve their worksite rules over time, but the.se
rules are not directly observable by other traders in any
given trade cycle loop. Consequently, standard labor njar-
ket theories purporting to explain the distribution ofwages
and profits on the basis of observable structural attributes
would presumably predict that these work suppliers and
employers should be earning approximately similar wages
and approximately similar profits.
To the contrary, however, Table V indicates a strong de
gree of path dependency' (hysteresis) in this labor market,
resulting in wage and profit distributions that have spec
tral rather than central tendency features. Specifically, for
each job capacity treatment reported in Table V, the la
bor market is capable of evolving multipledistinct clusters
of network formations with markedly different utility (wage
andprofit) levels for work suppliers andemployers. Indeed,
asindicated by the high standarddeviations for some ofthe
mean utility outcomes reported in Table V, there can be
a rather substantial degree of within-cluster variability in
wages and profits as well.
As indicated in Table V and elaborated in Tesfatsion
[lO], the variability in wages and profits (utility levels) ob
served in the current labor market context arises from two
sources: network hysteresiseffect-s, and behavioral hystere
siseffects. Regarding network hyst.eresis effects, temporary
shocks in the form of idiosyncratic worksite interactions
can result in persistently heterogeneous network relation
ships for traders who have identic-al observable worksite
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behaviors and structural attributes. Regarding behavioral
hysteresis effects, temporary shocks in the form of idiosyn
cratic worksite interactions can result in persistently het
erogeneous worksite behaviors for traders who have iden
tical observable structural attributes. Either effect can
support persistently heterogeneous earnings patterns and
employment histories across employed work suppliers and
across non-vacant employers.
IX. Concluding Remarks
This study presents, motivates, and, illiistrat^ the use
of the TVade Network Game Lab (TNG Lab), an agent-
basedcomputational laboratory (CL) for the study of evo
lutionary trade networks. In doing soj it constructively
demonstrates how CLs can be used to explore complex
socioeconomic processes that are difficult to model using
standard analjrtical and statistical tools. In particular, a
CL permits exploration to proceed at three levels of anal
ysis; interaction patterns (who is interacting with whom,
and with what regularity); interaction behaviors (how do
agents behave within any given interaction pattern); and
welfare outcomes (what consequences arise for individual
agents and for society as a whole as a result of th^e inter
action patterns). It is hoped that this study will encourage
the increased use of CLs for serious social science research.
Notes
The TNG Lab will be made available as freeware at
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/acecode.htm as soon
as a user's readme guide is complete.
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TABLE V
EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS FOR VARYING JOB CAPACITY LEVELS
D" %of AGGRESSIVE P-INACTIVE P-NICE UTILITY MPOWER
Runs w e w e w e w e w e
1-7 55% 2% 5% 23% 2% 74% 95% 0.87 1.38 -38% -1%
(4%) im m) (5%) (11%) (12%) (.13) (.04) (9%) (3%)
12-14 20% 10% 75% 38% 4% 48% 50% 0.88 1.46 -37% -f-4%
(18%) (43%) m (7%) (25%) (42%) (.21) (.22) (15%) (15%)
24 25% 100% 100% 100% 100% 0% 0% -0.12 -0.02 -109% -101%
(0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0) (0) (0%) (0%)
(a): Tight Job Capacity (JCAP = 1/2)
D° %of AGGRESSIVE P-INACTIVE P-NICE UTILITY MPOWER
Runs w e w e w e w e w e
1 5% 0% 0% 8% 0% 100% 100% 0.45 1.37 -68% -2%
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
12 70% 12% 31% 0% 0% 85% 85% 1.23 1.33 -12% -5%
(26%) (44%) (0%) (0%) (26%) (26%) (.19) (.14) (13%) (10%)
13-15 25% 63% 33% 13% 15% 48% 67% 1.08 0.97 -23% -31%
(45%) (40%) (4%) (3%) (40%) (35%) (.30) (.29) (21%) (21%)
(b): Balanced Job Capacity (JCAP = 1)
D° %of AGGRESSIVE P-INACTIVE P-NICE UTILITY MPOWER
Runs w e w e w e w e w e
0 5% 17% 0% 0% 0% 83% 100% 1.42 1.30 1% -7%
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
4-6 25% 2% 0% 0% 0% 98% 98% 1.37 1.38 -2% -1%
(3%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (.00) (.04) (0%) (2%)
14-17 70% 100% 29% 2% 29% 10% 60% 1.74 0.61 +26% -56%
(0%) (45%) (3%) (9%) (26%) (32%) (.32) (.27) (20%) (19%)






Fig. 1: Architecture of the TNG Lab
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Fig. 2: TNG/SimBioSys Class Structure
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Fig. 3: TNG Lab GUI Settings Screen
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Fig. 5: TNG Lab GUI Chart Screen








Fig. 6: TNG Lab GUI Animation Screen

















Fig. 7: TNG Lab GUI Physics Screen
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Fig. 8: Network Formation Under Tight Job Capacity with Z?® in 1-7
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Fig. 9: Network Formation Under Tight Job Capacity with D° in 12-14
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Fig. 10: Network Formation Under Tight Job Capacity with Z)® = 24
